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Elite Dominance and Under-investment in Mass Education:  
Disparity in the Social Development of the Indian States, 1960-92 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Despite more than four decades of planning efforts with an emphasis on balanced 
regional development, inter- and intra-state disparities in literacy rates in India are 
striking. While adult literacy rate in Kerala was about 91%, it was about half of that level 
(47%) in Bihar in 2001. Gender inequity continues to remain a serious problem in all the 
states, though it is far worse in the worse-performing ones; while the gender gap is about 
7% in Kerala, it is about 30% in Rajasthan and Bihar. Similarly, literacy rates among the 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are significantly lower than that for the 
general population. For example, literacy rate among the backward castes was only 
37.41% in 1991 as compared to 52.21% for India as a whole; it was even lower among 
women belonging to the backward castes (23.76% as compared to 39.29% for all Indian 
women).  
Differences in the nature of politicians elected are a possible mechanism through 
which social structure could influence the allocation of public spending and thereby the 
availability/access to public goods and services in the Indian states. This is because it is 
harder for a democratically elected government to be unresponsive to the needs and 
values of their clientele, especially when the electorate is well informed and politically 
aware. The question however remains as to why the women and the low caste people in 
the Indian states, especially in the worst performing ones, may not obtain the full 
attention of the politicians in a democracy even when they have the numerical strength. 
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When a country like Cameroon could more than double its rate of adult literacy in three 
decades after 1970 (from 30% to 71%), why a flourishing democracy like India that 
started in the 1970s with 33% adult literate would still struggle with a rate of 57% in 
2000 (with striking disparity in the literacy rates attained by female and low caste people 
as indicated above). In this context, the present paper explores the role of elite dominance 
on public spending on education in the Indian states. The paper contributes to the new 
institutional economics literature on the persistence of under-development and also to the 
growing literature on the political economy of the public goods provision in India. 
Recent institutional literature (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) 
suggests that poorer countries lack the institutions needed or have the wrong institutions 
for economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (2005), offer a parallel argument to suggest that 
underlying constituencies (with coexistence of self-perpetuating interest groups) rather 
than poor institutions may perpetuate this underdevelopment indulging in low investment 
in mass education. We shall, in this context, examine the hypothesis of elite dominance to 
explain underinvestment in mass education (a la Bourguignon and Verdier, 1999, among 
others) and also its persistence (a la Acemoglu, 2006) in the Indian context.  
In doing so, the paper also contributes to some recent studies that highlighted the 
importance of the political process on the pattern of public spending at different levels of 
administrative units as well as on the provision of public goods/services in India. For 
example, Betancourt and Gleason (2000) highlight the importance of electoral 
participation, selectivity in the allocations against Muslims and Scheduled castes in the 
allotment of nurses, doctors and teachers to rural areas of the Indian districts. Banerjee 
and Somanathan (2001) suggest that more heterogeneous communities tend to be 
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politically weaker and therefore are less likely to get the goods they want and more likely 
to get some of the inferior substitutes. Chattopadhyay and Dufflo (2004) argue that 
women councillors in elected village councils with reserved seats for women tend to 
invest more in drinking water, fuel and employment generating activities such as road 
construction (compared to those unreserved village councils).    
Next turning to the studies pertaining to state-level spending on various accounts, 
Besley and Burgess (2001) highlight that media could play an important role to ensure  
government accountability to the electorate. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) argue that 
while landowners would favour expenditure on irrigation, budget allocation would shift 
more towards labour-intensive road construction projects, as landless gain more 
participation with increasing decentralisation. Khemani in a series of papers (2003, 2004) 
highlights the effects of federal politics on earnings and spending of the states.  
The present paper focuses on the role of ‘elite dominance’ to explain this 
disparate nature of social development over the period 1960-92 in sixteen major states in 
India. The issue of elite dominance, though pertinent in explaining this disparity more 
than fifty years after India’s independence in 1947, remains much unexplored. It is 
argued here that the social, economic and political dominance of the elite in India is 
closely intertwined with the gender and the age-old institution of caste where the male 
members of the upper castes (at the expense of female and/or low caste members of the 
population) tend to enjoy better economic and political status at local, state and national 
levels. Although India's constitution forbids negative public discrimination of female and 
low caste people and introduces various ways to overcome the traditional barriers of 
gender and caste, gender and caste-based interaction/discrimination in all spheres of life 
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is not uncommon still today and has not eroded the initial disadvantages of the female 
and low-caste people. The result is the striking disparity in the education indicators 
attained by these marginalized groups.  
Our analysis of the state-level data1 from the selected states for the period 1960-
92 suggests that greater land held by the top 5% of the population lowers spending on 
education while a greater proportion of minority representations in the ruling government 
fails to have any significant impact on education spending.2 We also find that states with 
more poverty rates have significantly lower spending while those with greater initiatives 
of   land reform legislations have significantly higher spending on education. 
Unfortunately, gender, caste and class based politics perpetuates inequality. Spread of 
human capital could help to overcome the traditional disparities of caste, class and gender 
by allowing individuals to take advantage of the existing social opportunity, to make 
conscious and informed choice in voting as well as to induce direct political participation.  
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 investigates the concept and nature 
of elite dominance in India while Section 3 describes the data, explains the methodology 
and analyses the empirical results. The final section concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 We choose this period to dissociate the effects of pro-market reforms on state spending on education. 
Interestingly, this period also marked the period prior to the introduction of the 73rd amendment of the 
Constitution in 1993 (see discussion in section 2.2).  
2
 Some may suggest that this result somewhat contrasts the Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) finding that 
elected women members of the village councils in West Bengal (after the introduction of reservation of 
women seats in 1993) have significant impact on certain types of investment including water supply, 
employment. Later we argue that our result pertaining to education spending at the state level is supported 
by the fact there is no significant association between election of these representatives and turnout of 
female and low-caste voters. In other words there is indirect evidence that there is no mandate for these 
elected members to serve the marginalised people. 
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2. CONCEPT AND NATURE OF ELITE DOMINANCE IN INDIA 
Given the pronounced unitary bias in the Indian federation, there are limits to the 
authority of the state government’s spending ability as dictated by the union, state and 
concurrent lists of the Indian constitution. While the union government is involved in 
general state-level development especially with respect to the development of the core 
sectors, states have the primary responsibility for most social sectors including education, 
health, community and social services. Each state has an elected assembly headed by the 
chief minister (CM), who is in charge of formulating and implementing social 
development policies in the states. We label the particular state government ruled by the 
majority party in power as a ‘political regime’. Political regimes may differ in terms of 
representation from and inclusion of different sections of population in their electoral 
base. This could result in differences in the democratic functioning of different regimes 
and could explain the variation in public spending on education in the Indian states.   
 
2.1. Concept of elite dominance 
Initial statistics quoted in the introduction suggest that women and low caste people are 
not only worse off compared to the general population when residing in any state of 
India, they are more so when residing in the poor performing states like Bihar, MP, 
Orissa, Rajasthan or UP. The question that arises here is why these minority groups fail to 
attract the attention of the democratically elected government despite their large numbers.   
Recent development of the institutional economics and the political economy 
models could shed some light into the possible mechanisms in this respect. The 
dominance by an elite, which does not support human capital investment in the masses is 
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a theme in several theoretical models including Bourguignon and Verdier (1999), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (1998), Galor and Moav (2000). In particular, Bourguignon and 
Verdier (1999) argue that the oligarchy will oppose widespread education because 
educated people are more likely to demand political power, which may undermine the 
dominance of the elite. This may result in a lower human capital outcome than otherwise. 
Similar argument is found in Rajan and Zingales (2005) who highlight the fact that 
education does give the poor the ability to take advantage of pro-market reforms and thus 
make them predisposed to further reform. Thus unlike Bourguignon and Verdier (1999) 
where education tends to increase the political participation of the poor, it is the fear of 
comprehensive reforms that makes the oligopolist in Rajan and Zingales (2005) to oppose 
education reforms. We, however, argue that empowerment of the marginalised non-elites 
(women and low caste through greater investment in education) not only improves their 
economic participation, but also enhances their political participation, directly (by 
demanding political power) and/or indirectly through making informed choice in a 
democratic election.   
 
 
2.2. Nature of elite dominance in India 
India is an interesting case in point where social, economic and political dominance of 
elite class is closely intertwined with the age-old institution of caste as well as the gender 
disparity. Although many other nations are characterized by social inequality, perhaps 
nowhere else in the world has inequality been so elaborately constructed as in the Indian 
institution of caste. Although India's constitution forbids negative public discrimination 
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on the basis of caste, caste ranking and caste-based interaction have occurred for 
centuries and will continue to do so well into the foreseeable future, more in the 
countryside than in urban areas and more in the realms of kinship and marriage than in 
less personal interactions.  
Castes are ranked, named, endogamous (in-marrying) groups, membership in 
which is achieved by birth. Many castes are traditionally associated with an occupation, 
such as high-ranking Brahmans (priests); middle-ranking farmer and artisan groups, such 
as potters, barbers, and carpenters; and very low-ranking "Untouchable" leatherworkers, 
butchers, launderers, and latrine cleaners. Although the term Untouchable appears in 
literature produced by these low-ranking castes, in the 1990s, many politically conscious 
members of these groups prefer to refer to themselves as Dalit, a Hindi word meaning 
oppressed or downtrodden. Since 1935 "Untouchables" have been known as Scheduled 
Castes, referring to their listing on government rosters, or schedules. Numerous groups 
usually called tribes (often referred to as Scheduled Tribes) are also integrated into the 
caste system to varying degrees. There is a close association between ritual rank on the 
caste hierarchy, ownership of both land and non-land assets (e.g., see Pal, 1994) and 
economic prosperity. Members of higher-ranking castes tend, on the whole, to be more 
prosperous than members of lower-ranking castes. Many lower-caste people lack any 
assets and live in conditions of great poverty and social disadvantage. 
Within castes explicit standards are maintained. Transgressions may be dealt with 
by a village caste council, which meets periodically to adjudicate issues relevant to the 
caste. Such councils are usually formed of groups of elders, almost always males. 
Punishments such as fines and outcasting, either temporary or permanent, can be 
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enforced. In rare cases, a person is excommunicated from the caste for gross infractions 
of caste rules. An example of such an infraction might be marrying or openly cohabiting 
with a mate of a caste lower than one's own; such behavior would usually result in the 
higher-caste person dropping to the status of the lower-caste person. 
While women are guaranteed equality under the Indian constitution, legal 
protection has little effect in the face of prevailing (age-old) patriarchal traditions. 
Families are far less likely to educate girls than boys, and far more likely to pull them out 
of school, either to help out at home or from fear of violence; dowry may also have a role 
to play here. India has the largest population of non-school-going working girls. India’s 
constitution guarantees free primary school education for both boys and girls up to age 
14. While this goal has been repeatedly reconfirmed, its implementation has not been. 
Women work longer hours and their work is more arduous than men's, yet their work is 
unrecognized. Female infanticide and sex-selective abortions are additional forms of 
violence that reflect the devaluing of females in Indian society. Women lack the power to 
decide who they will marry, and are often married off as children. Legal loopholes are 
used to deny women inheritance rights. Dalit women have been the worst sufferers being 
suppressed by both men and women from all castes and class, resulting in their dismal 
performance (Seenarine, 1997). Thus surviving through a normal life cycle is a resource-
poor woman’s greatest challenge. 
 
From social to political dominance of elite 
Social dominance of the upper caste elite could easily be translated into the political 
arena, especially in a democratic set-up. In the words of Key (1956), ‘the nature of the 
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workings of the government depends ultimately on the men who run it. The men we elect 
to office and the circumstances we create that affect their work determine the nature of 
the popular government.’ Until the recent introduction of the elected village councils in 
1993 (via 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution) with reservation of seats for women 
and low caste members, there was no mechanism to prevent the dominance of traditional 
village elite in the village council, who could then easily go up the political ladder and 
may move to state assembly and national parliament. Thus, social and political elites are 
more likely to be male and come from the traditional upper caste in the Indian social 
hierarchy (especially in the pre-1993 period), exercising their political domination 
through state mechanism as well.     
Our analysis focuses on the period 1960-92, i.e., the period before the 73rd 
amendment of the Indian Constitution commenced.3 This period has been marked by the 
predominance of the Indian National Congress (INC) regime in most states, especially 
until 1977, important exceptions being Tamil Nadu and Kerala where alternative regimes 
came to power from as early as 1967.  
 The social base for Congress had been the landed elite and the rural habitations 
they controlled resulting in a dominance of the upper class in Congress politics, 
especially in the first 30 years after independence. In the years after Independence 
untouchable support for Congress had clearly strengthened. From 1952 until 1989, with 
the exception of the post-Emergency election of 1977, Untouchables tended to function in 
both national and State elections as a 'vote bank' for Congress. Their vote for Congress 
was a vote for the party of government, a party that had committed itself to a program of 
                                                 
3
 Note that reservation of the seats for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe has been  in place at various 
state and National elections. Following the 73rd amendment of the Constitution, discussion is now under 
way about the reservation of seats for women at the state and national levels. 
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action on Untouchability and poverty. While the Untouchables were a crucial Congress 
vote bank in a majority of individual States, they did not cling to Congress in regions 
where another party or movement rose to dominance. The major examples of long-term 
non-Congress dominance are West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. 
Untouchables in the former two States have for a number of years had a strong 
identification with the Communist Party in its several divisions - in recent years 
predominantly with the dominant Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)). In 
conrast, in both Tamil Nadu and Andhra, however, the Untouchables have not been 
wholly lost to Congress, despite the general popularity/predominance of the non-brahmin 
movement of DMK/ADMK in Tamil Nadu and TDP in Andhra.  
Within Congress the importance of the Untouchable vote however did not 
translate itself into great influence for individual Untouchables in either the organisation 
of the party or the ministry. In particular, the building of the compensatory discrimination 
system arose more from the arithmetic of elections and the goodwill of sections of the 
elite than from the efforts of Dalit parliamentarians. Although a small number of state and 
national politicians have gained a measure of ministerial seniority, none has had either a 
long period at the apex of ministerial service or any substantial political base. Perhaps it 
is to be expected that a collection of castes distinguished by their overall subordination 
would not produce the highest crop of educated, experienced and generally talented 
politicians. Nevertheless issues of talent and preparation for public office among low-
caste politicians can scarcely constitute the primary explanation for the low 
representation of Untouchables at the highest political levels. There have also been 
persistent suggestions that Dalit politicians have not thrived within Congress if they have 
too strenuously promoted the cause of their own people. It remains an important truth that 
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the ideological and social makeup of Congress has made it less than welcoming to highly 
assertive advocates of the Untouchable cause. Low social standing has also made 
individual Untouchable spokesmen relatively easy targets for political demolition. 
Untouchables have therefore tended to construct their political careers as dependants 
within factions led by high-caste politicians. It is impossible to think of a single example 
of a substantial multi-caste faction leader who is/was himself a Dalit. 
Under-representation of women in the Indian politics is a well-known fact; what 
is more disappointing is how little has changed in this respect since the Independence. 
The candidates fielded by the various political parties are still dominantly male: women 
account for between 1-5 per cent of all candidates in the states under consideration. Very 
often these women come from elite upper caste background with some political tradition 
in the family or being close to a prominent male leader. However, their role in public 
decision making is rather negligible. They can rarely secure a position in the ministry and 
even when they do it, if ever, they will not be assigned any key role. Also more ambitious 
women members of the legislative assembly will choose to speak about issues not 
relating to women’s affairs, but those relating to industry, trade, economy and 
international relations, where power and influence converge. Thus women’s 
representation, though important on the grounds of social justice and legitimacy, does not 
naturally translate into improved representations of women’s issues and interests. 
Marginalised people everywhere have always aspired to build an egalitarian 
world. There has been a long tradition/history of resistance and creativity from below in 
different parts of India. Ranged against caste and Brahminism, this rational liberating 
tradition is to be found in the heterodoxies of various inclinations, particularly Buddhism, 
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the movements of subaltern saint-poets, Sufism and Sikhism. This legacy was carried 
forward in modern India by, more than anybody else, Ambedkar (a dalit leader) and 
Gandhi. After independence, Ambedkar almost single-handedly wrote India's 
constitution, including key provisions barring caste-based discrimination. Nonetheless, 
discriminatory treatment of Dalits remains a factor in daily life, especially in villages, 
even in the twenty-first century. Despite their numerical strength, their voices are not 
heard through the ballot box. An important reason is that this group is more likely to be 
less educated and poorly informed and are generally less inclined to vote than richer and 
better educated citizens. Clearly average voter turnout (especially among women and low 
caste voters) has been significantly lower, especially in these worst performing states (see 
Table 3). In addition to lack of literacy and the general deprivation, the latter could also 
be a result of the criminalisation of politics (that resulted in many criminals being elected, 
Dréze and Sen, 1995), especially in some of the worst performing states like UP and 
Bihar, threatening/bribing the electorate (especially those less educated and marginalised 
and therefore vulnerable in a caste-based society) during election times to vote or not to 
vote in a certain way. With widespread illiteracy in these states many voters are not able 
to gain the full information necessary to make an informed choice and the judiciary too 
has often failed to uphold this fundamental right.  
Let us in this context consider the case of politicization of teachers and teaching 
unions (Kingdon and Muzzamil, 2003) in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) that 
could illustrate how elite dominance is exercised in the education sector, especially when 
schools and other educational institutions receive government funds. UP is one of the 4 
states in India that still has a legislative council – upper chamber of the Assembly- where 
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teachers have guaranteed representations. The latter has resulted in influential political 
lobbying and pressure groups from within the system at a local level in the form of 
teachers’ organisations. Education related legislation in UP has often been framed under 
immense pressure from teacher’s organisation, especially at the primary and secondary 
level. Thus teachers in schools (as opposed to higher education) have been instrumental 
for local base for the political parties in the state. The latter has induced teachers’ unions 
to indulge in regular strikes and other actions to promote their own interests (higher 
salary and job security) and rarely, if ever, for broader improvements of schooling and 
promotion of education in general. System of grants in aid from the government is 
however not linked with the qualitative performance of schools/number of working days. 
Forming a trade union is a legitimate worker right, but it makes it difficult for the 
government to deal impartially with teacher’s demands. The natural consequence has 
been very poor performance of primary and secondary schools in the state as highlighted 
in existing literature (Dreze and Gazdar, 1997; Probe Report, 1999; Dreze and Kingdon, 
2001).  
Thus elite dominance could be rationalised in terms of a political economy 
outcome that entails benefits to both the political authorities and the elites. On the one 
hand, entrusting the governance of the state’s education sector to a tiny elite (e.g., 
teacher’s unions0, gives that elite huge advantages in political lobbying. Naturally these 
oligarchs lobby for weak regulations to facilitate private benefits of control. On the other 
hand, political insiders too see the benefits of cooperating with the oligarchs (especially 
during election times) as outweighing the costs, despite the detrimental effects on the 
masses in general.  
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Once in place, elite dominance can be self-sustaining in the absence of some 
further shocks, inducing changes in endowment to break the vicious circle.4 In this 
respect, our analysis focuses on the role of (a) incidence of poverty and (b) land reform 
programmes, both of which could to some extent reflect the strength of demand (or lack 
of it). In particular, no one can deny the positive effect of land reform that has been 
successful elsewhere. For example, the rise of the gentry in Britain, the force behind the 
growing power of Parliament, accompanied the taming of the power of great lords and 
the Church by Henry VII and Henry VIII and the sale of their lands (Tawney, 1949). 
Similar events took place in Japan (Nelson, 1993) and Korea (Jeon and Kim, 2000) that 
led to successful land reforms accompanied by high growth in these countries. In fact 
introduction of land reforms and education reforms prior to the introduction of 
privatization and competitive reforms in a number of Asian economies laid the 
groundwork for faster growth. Secondly, in the Indian context no one can also deny the 
negative effect of poverty which could have been instrumental in supporting the elitist 
education policy that neglected the provision of basic education while highly subsidizing 
the higher education throughout India in the post-independent period. Persistence of 
poverty often changes the priorities of life where survival in the present period is more 
important than investment in education for long-term betterment of the quality of life.  
 
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we use the state-level data to examine the role of elite dominance on 
                                                 
4
 Rajan and Zingales (2005) in this respect discuss the positive of role of protestant religion, Nationalism 
and Communism to encourage mass education in different societies. 
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changes in education spending over the term of the government in the selected states. 
Section 3.1 describes the data while the empirical analysis is performed and discussed in 
section 3.2.   
 
3.1. Data and sample characteristics  
The data set consists of state-level economic and political variables available from the 
World Bank (Ozler, Dutt and Ravallion, 1996), Besley and Burgess (2000) and Election 
Commission of India. It is not easy to isolate the effects of state politics from everything 
else going on in the country, especially since the launching of the Indian liberalisation 
programme in the early 1990s. Our analysis therefore focuses on the 1960-92 period, 
before the effects of liberalisation came to be realised.  
The data points are the election years. The idea is that elected politicians will want 
to attain their targets by the time of the next election when the electorate decides whether 
to re-elect them. In most cases elections take place every five years though there can be 
an election before the next scheduled one if the government in power collapses. There 
can however be problems in the estimates if, for example, policies implemented in year 
four takes a further two years to complete so that the model will assign the effect to the 
next election cycle. While we need to be cautious in interpreting these results, one 
election cycle lag appears to be the best available option.  
  
3.2. Empirical analysis 
Our analysis is developed in three steps. First we examine the role of elite dominance on 
the changing share of state-level spending on education (as a share of state output). 
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Secondly, we include the state-specific poverty rate to check if under-investment in 
education by the elite is actually supported by the demand for education in the selected 
states. Since INC has been the dominant political regime in most states during much of 
the study period, next we examine if predominance of the INC regime in the selected 
states is closely associated with economic and political elite dominance in our sample. 
Finally, we examine various accounts of government expenditure to find out if the elite 
has given priority to some accounts over education.    
 
Measures of elite dominance 
First step of our empirical analysis is to quantify the concept of elite dominance. In order 
to capture different dimensions of this complex issue, we generate two sets of indirect 
measures – one related to economic dominance of the elite while the other to their 
political dominance.  
Land is both the main productive asset and the basis of survival of the majority in 
India still today. Thus land tenure is the foundation of social structure and political 
power. Very often there is also a close correspondence between caste and ownership of 
land in the Indian society; thus upper caste people often enjoy a much greater share of 
land while the low caste people turn out to be landless or marginal farmers. In the 
absence of a better indicator, we could form some idea of economic dominance of the 
elite, especially in the rural areas, from the distribution of land in these states. Table 2 
shows the average percentage of total land area held by top 5% and bottom 40% of the 
population and also the Gini coefficient in the distribution of land (LANDGINI) over 
1960-92. Since there is very little variation in the Gini index of land distribution, we use 
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the land held by the top 5% of the population (TOP5) as an index of economic dominance 
of the elite. 
We also try a composite index of different types of land reform legislations (CLR) 
in these states (see Besley and Burgess, 2000). Since land reforms are likely to have 
effects over time, we measure the extent of reform since the beginning of the data period 
by a cumulative variable that aggregates the number of legislative reforms. While crude, 
this could allow us to reasonably quantify the land reform measures. The underlying idea 
is that states where more land reform legislations were undertaken could be regarded as 
states with a more harmonious class relationship, thus alleviating the dominance of elite 
upper class. Table 2 clearly demonstrates the discrepancy in the distribution of land 
between top 20% and bottom 40% of the population in all the states; the extent of the 
discrepancy is much higher in some states including Punjab and Maharashtra than in 
others like J&K, Assam or Kerala. Moderate degree of discrepancy persists in most other 
states though. There is also wide variation in the land reform activities across the states. 
In particular, the average values of this land reform legislation index appear to be 
relatively higher in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, states known for their 
successful social development programmes.  
Further measures of economic elite dominance could be derived from the 
available information on distribution of consumer expenditure per capita (which also 
includes expenses on consumer durables). We have information on rural (GINI1) and 
urban Gini (GINI2) indices in the distribution of monthly per capita consumer 
expenditure; clearly higher values of rural and urban Gini indices would account for 
higher levels of dominance of an elite upper class in the state.  The last two columns of 
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Table 1 shows the inter-state variation in the average values of rural and urban Gini 
indices in the distribution of consumer expenditure per capita over 1960-92. Gini indices 
of consumer expenditure however fail to be significant in the regression exercise that we 
perform in section 3.  Unfortunately, we do not have any alternative measure of the 
distribution of consumer expenditure like that (TOP5) available for the distribution of 
landholding.   
 Measures of political dominance of elite in the Indian states, on the other hand, 
may be captured from the composition of the ruling party in power. In particular, we 
include proportion of women and scheduled caste/tribe members of the legislative 
assembly in the ruling party, because these representatives of the marginalized people 
could make a difference in the formulation of policy and/or allocation of state spending to 
education in a democratic set-up. This information is summarized in Table 2 and 
highlights the marginal difference in the shares of women and low caste members of the 
assembly in the ruling government between INC and other non-INC regimes. In general 
INC shares of these seats won by the minority groups (women and SC/ST members) are 
higher in many states during 1960-92 (though only marginally), important exceptions 
being Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu (states where non-INC parties offered 
significant challenges to INC regimes for substantial period of time).  
 
Other explanatory variables 
In addition to various measures of Elite Dominance, we also control for some other 
possible covariates in our analysis. First, there is some recent literature that stresses the 
link between ethnic fractionalisation and the poor delivery of public services (e.g., see 
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Alesina, Baqir and Easterly,1999). Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) have extended the 
idea of ethnic diversity for the provision of public goods in the Indian districts and 
suggest that more heterogeneous communities tend to be politically weaker and therefore 
are less likely to get the goods they want and are more likely to get some of the inferior 
substitutes.  
Indian society has traditionally been multireligious (including majority Hindus 
(80% or above), Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains), and multilingual (there 
are sixteen official languages in India). This social structure is further complicated by the 
prevailing caste system among the Hindus that distinguishes between upper caste (16%), 
other backward castes (43.7), scheduled caste (15%) and scheduled tribe (7.5%)5, giving 
rise to a pluralistic society. This social structure did not pose any problem in the feudal 
politics that remained non-competitive where different groups were loyal to one or other 
dynasty. However with the consolidation of the British rule, Indian politics became 
competitive when different religious and linguistic groups began to compete with each 
other for the share of political power and government jobs. This trend continued and even 
in modern India - politicians continued to exploit this diversity and often catered to 
certain sections of the population, thus responding to their needs and disregarding the 
needs of others. Otherwise it is difficult for the ruling party to satisfy needs of all 
different factions and stay in power. A direct measure of ethnic fractionalisation would 
therefore be to construct a composite index of social heterogeneity (SOCHETY) from the 
proportion of the population belonging to various ethno-religious groups including upper 
caste Hindus, scheduled caste, scheduled tribes, Muslims, Jains, Buddhists, Christians, 
                                                 
5
 Source: Government of India, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission 
Report), First Part, Vol. 1 (1980), p. 56. These figures are best estimates. The last caste census was taken in 
1931. 
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Sikhs and others. Inter-state variation in the average values of social heterogeneity 
measure is summarised in Table 3 for the study period 1960-92.   
 Another possible factor that could influence social spending at the state-level 
relates to the growing incidence of coalition governments in the Indian states. While the 
experience of coalition governments at the Centre goes back to 1977, it is a more recent 
trend in the assembly elections that have given rise to alliances between/among various 
political parties to form government at the state level. Existence of a coalition 
government may have important implications for the state spending patterns, since given 
the divergent agenda of the constituent parties, there may prevail a lack of coordination 
over budgetary decisions. This is because individual coalition partners in multi-party 
coalition governments may have distinct interests, which in turn would induce to protect 
its own share of the budget. Roubini and Sachs (1989) suggest that there is a tendency for 
larger budget deficits in countries characterized by a short average tenure of government 
and by the presence of many political parties in a ruling coalition. Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995) argue that fragmentation creates impediments for the co-ordination required to 
initiate and sustain policy changes. More cohesive systems are more likely to generate 
stable electoral and legislative support for economic reform. Echeverri-Gent (1998) 
however argued that the fear of losing power could in fact be considered the biggest 
strength of a weak coalition government. A downfall of the government would be a loss 
to every member of the coalition, which in turn may induce weak-coalition minority 
governments to undertake bold economic reforms. Dutta (1996) has examined the impact 
of coalition politics on some fiscal variables of the central government for the period 
1967-93. We extend this argument to see if the coalition governments at the state level 
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have positive (a la Echeverri-Gent, 1998) or negative (a la Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) 
effects on state-level spending on education.  
  
3.2.1. Determinants of Changes in Education Spending  
In this section, we determine the changing share of state spending on education (as a 
share of state output). Taking the share of particular spending in relation to state domestic 
product allows us to control for state’s wealth. In particular, we consider the change in 
the value of the variable from the last election to be the dependent variable of interest. 
This differenced variable allows us to examine how the political regime would change the 
behaviour of the government in power while the level variable would simply reflect the 
correlation between political variables and the spending on education. Using the first 
difference of the state spending variable also allows us to reduce the possible problem of 
simultaneity arising from the inclusion of some of the explanatory variable described 
below. 
Among the explanatory variables, we include the initial value of spending on 
education (EDUEXPY) and expect a negative sign on its coefficient; the latter would 
indicate convergence, if any, in the level of this spending among the states over time, 
conditional on values of other covariates. As indicated earlier, we also include measures 
of economic (TOP5 and CLR in two alternative specifications6) and political 
(PWOMRUL and PSCSTSRUL) dominance of elite. Note however that while proportion 
of land held by top 5% of the population (TOP5) is a measure of dominance exercised by 
the landed elite, index of land reform legislations (CLR) as well as representation of 
                                                 
6
 As possible alternative measures of elite dominance, we also tried including the share of land held by top 
10% and 20% of the population as well as Gini indices in the distribution of average monthly consumer 
expenditure per capita; but these variables never turned out to be significant. See discussion in section 3.2. 
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women (PWOMRUL) and low caste (PSCSTRUL) in the ruling party really reflects the 
lack of dominance by the elite. It is expected that measures of elite dominance (or lack of 
it) would be associated with lower (higher) spending on education. Third, we include 
measures of ethnic fractionalisation (SOCHETY)7 and expect that the coefficient of these 
measures would be negative in the determination of change in education spending. 
Finally we include a binary variable to indicate if the government in power is a coalition 
government (COALITION). The resultant effect could be positive, negative or may even 
be insignificant if the positive and negative effects outweigh each other (see discussion 
earlier in section 3.2).  
Fixed effects panel data estimates are summarised in Tables 4A.  A positive 
(negative) coefficient estimate would indicate an increase (decrease) in the share of 
education spending associated with an increase in the value of the explanatory variable. 
We show estimates for four specifications (columns 1-4) depending on the particular 
measure of elite dominance, with control for social heterogeneity and presence of 
coalition government, if any.  
Interestingly, the initial level of education spending remains insignificant in all 
specifications. This would reflect the lack of convergence in social spending across the 
sample states and could perhaps be rationalised by the divergent agenda of ruling political 
regimes in these states. Secondly, ethnic heterogeneity and presence of coalition 
government both tend to lower spending on education. While the result for ethnic 
                                                 
7
 We also tried including an indicator variable measuring if the state government is aligned to the 
government at the centre. INC has remained in power at the centre during most of this period, except 1977-
80 (Janata Party rule), 1989-90 (National Front coalition government). Thus the binary variable takes a 
value 1 if the party in power at the state assembly is also the party in power at the centre and 0 otherwise. 
Alliance with the union could be important in determining both earning and spending patterns of the state 
(e.g., see Khemani, 2003). But the variable was never significant in explaining change in state level 
spending and that is why we exclude it from the final specification. 
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heterogeneity is in line with Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) that for the coalition 
government contradicts Echiverri-Gent’s argument. In contrast this supports that offered 
by Haggard and Kaufman (1995) so that the presence of a coalition government is 
associated with greater fragmentation and lack of cohesive policy at the state level, 
resulting in lower education spending in the subsequent years. Finally for given levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity and presence of coalition government, if any, effect of both 
measures of economic elite dominance turns out to be significant. For example, greater 
share of land among top 5% of the population (indicating higher incidence of elite 
dominance) is associated with lower spending. Secondly, higher value of land reform 
legislations (associated with lower degree of elite dominance) results in significantly 
higher spending on education. Measures of political (non)dominance of elite however 
remain insignificant. For example, higher proportion of women and low caste members 
of the assembly in the ruling party does not significantly enhance education spending. 
However, when we add up the proportion of female and low caste members of the 
assembly in the ruling party, the variable becomes nearly significant, but only at around 
10% level. The latter perhaps validates the general belief that higher representation of the 
marginalised people in the ruling government cannot by itself induce higher investment 
in education (see discussion in section 2)8, especially if these members do not have any 
mandate to serve these marginalised people  Taken together, there is some confirmation 
that higher degree of economic elite dominance (despite the difficulty of measuring it 
                                                 
8
 In order to explain this result, we examine if the winning seat in the assembly by female/low caste 
members is closely correlated with the turnout among female/low caste voters. If there is no such 
correlation it would not be necessary for these members to address the particular issue relevant for these 
communities.  Indeed, our results show that there is no significant association between turnout among 
female/low caste voters and the election of women/low-caste members in the assembly, after controlling for 
initial illiteracy rate, ethnic heterogeneity of the state over the study period. 
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precisely) is associated with significantly lower spending on education over the period 
1960-92 while greater representation of marginalised groups in the ruling government 
(i.e., lower political dominance of elite) fails to generate any perceptible impact. In an 
attempt to explain this latter result, we examine if there is a direct correlation between 
election of women/SC/ST members in the ruling government of a particular state and the 
marginalised women/S/ST voters in our sample. Results shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix tend to suggest that turnout of women or SC/ST voters does not significantly 
affect the proportion of these members of the assembly in the ruling government. This 
perhaps offers some indirect confirmation that women/SC/ST members of the assembly 
are not necessarily elected by the women/SC/ST voters – thus these members would not 
have any significant mandate to serve their cause so far as the education spending is 
concerned. Finally, we would like to highlight the result related to land reform 
legislations, which offers some hope to break the vicious cycle of elite dominance and 
persistence of underdevelopment through successful land reform programmes, even in the 
Indian states characterised by all-pervasive gender/caste divisions. 
 
3.2.2. Inclusion of demand  
The analysis of elite dominance is primarily supply-driven while no one can deny the 
importance of demand for education as well to explain the persistence of lack of 
educational attainment among the marginalised groups within a democratic set-up. There 
is a large literature on household demand for education in low-income regions, which 
highlights the significant role of gender, household income (Behrman and Knowles, 
1999), parental (especially mother’s) education (Glewwe, 1999), among others. Since, 
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our study is conducted at the state-level, we consider the corresponding aggregate (state-
level) demand factors primarily related to access to endowment (or lack of it) of the 
households. In the absence of any better indicator, the analysis in this section includes 
poverty head count ratio that measures the lack of endowment/resources among poor 
households as the key demand factor driving the demand for basic education (or lack of 
it) 9 at the state level. The underlying rationale is that survival in the current period is 
likely to be more crucial for the poor than the long-term prospect of improving income by 
investing in education today. Thus in addition to the variables included in Table 4A, we 
now augment each of these four models by including the poverty head count ratio. 
Estimates of these augmented models are presented in Table 4B. While the basic results 
discussed in section 3.2.2 remain unchanged, we get additional insight by including the 
poverty rate variable. In particular, there is confirmation that state spending on education 
is less in poorer states, even after controlling for all other factors including elite 
dominance. We thus argue that lower spending on education in the Indian states is not 
only a result of elite dominance, but is also driven by lower demand for basic education 
in states with higher poverty rates.  
 
3.2.3. Elite dominance and non-developmental Spending 
So far our analysis for the period 1960-92 suggests that the elite has an incentive to 
under-invest in mass education; the latter could also be supported by the lack of demand 
for education, especially among the poor and vulnerable marginalised groups. The 
question that naturally arises here is if the Elite have a preference for some other 
                                                 
9
 The correlation between household resources, income and wealth and educational attainment is well 
documented (e.g., see Behrman and Knowles, 1999). We thus focus on the effect of poverty rate that 
measures lack of resources/endowment on changes in education spending in our sample.   
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expenditure account. Our investigation in this respect has focused on the trade-off 
between development and the non-development spending of the Indian states. Total 
government spending of the state governments in India is divided into development and 
non-development spending. Development spending includes spending on economic (e.g, 
agriculture and rural development) and social services (e.g., education, health, family 
welfare and other community services). Non-development spending in contrast includes 
spending on interest payments on past debts, expenditure on fiscal and administrative 
services, pensions and retirement benefits, non-planned expenditure on social security, 
welfare and food subsidies.  
 Between 1970 and early 1990s, total state government expenditure has grown 
substantially (five fold); growth in development spending has however slowed down 
dramatically: from 13% in the 1970s to 7% in the 80s and then to1% in the 90s. Within 
development spending account, social services grew the least in the 80s and the 90s. 
Sachs et al. (2000) argued that the resource constraints in state finances have been 
accentuated by a near stagnant tax-GDP ratio, a rising share of non-developmental outlay 
in the total expenditure, large volumes of hidden or implicit subsidies and increasing 
financial losses of state enterprises while a growing pressure on state finances has 
stemmed from the rising demand for public services. The critical problem in state 
finances is not only one of high levels of expenditure (relative to revenue mobilization), 
but also one of increasing distortions in the pattern of expenditure (i.e., higher growth of 
non-development vis-à-vis development spending). Following this trend in the allocation 
of state-level spending, especially towards non-developmental spending, we shall in this 
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section explore if elite dominance is one of the explanations for the trend increase in non-
developmental spending (as a share of state output).  
 As before, we ran four sets of regressions to explain changes in total (a) 
developmental and (b) non-developmental spending, depending on the measures of 
economic and political elite dominance. As with the estimates of the changes in education 
spending (see Table 4A and 4B), measures of political dominance variables turn out to be 
insignificant; so we do not show these results. Table 4C thus shows the two sets of fixed 
effects estimates for (a) and (b), using two alternative measures of economic elite 
dominance. We think these estimates offer some political economy explanations of the 
pattern of state spending away from development account and into non-development 
account. Indeed there is some confirmation that greater share of landholding among top 
5% of the population is significantly and negatively associated with changes in 
developmental spending while it is positively associated with that in non-developmental 
spending in our sample. As before, the trend is just the opposite if states enact more land 
reform legislations. There is also significant evidence of divergent agenda among the 
Indian states as states with higher initial developmental and non-developmental spending 
continue to do so and there are no signs of catching up here.  
 Thus there is evidence of a close association between elite dominance and share 
of non-development spending in our sample; the latter is likely to be motivated by two 
possible and opposite mechanisms: increasing development (that includes education) as 
opposed to non-development spending is likely to dilute the power of the elite while 
increasing the share of the non-development spending could help maintain the group 
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associated with the elite through offering subsidies and other non-planned benefits to the 
elite. 
 
3.2.4. Elite dominance and Political regime  
Finally, we explore if the measures of elite dominance is also significantly associated 
with the presence of dominant political regime in these states. Since INC has been the 
dominant political regime during our sample period, we focus on the determinants of the 
predominance of INC regime in the selected states. The latter is measured by a binary 
variable indicating if the ruling INC regime continued to run the government for a second 
term and is explained, among others, by some measure of elite dominance. Depending on 
the measure of elite dominance we have four different sets of results, as summarised in 
columns 1-4 of Table 5.   
These estimates do suggest that land held by top 5% of the population 
significantly enhances the probability of Congress predominance while a higher value of 
land reform legislations index in a state tends to lower it. Measures of political 
dominance, as before, remain statistically insignificant either individually (column 3) or 
jointly (Column 4) for the sample period 1960-92.  
This is not to say that the elite dominance will disappear with the decline of the 
Congress predominance in the 1990s.10 One example could perhaps validate this 
observation. Even the recent democratic revolution in North India in the mid-1990s that 
resulted in the election of a Dalit government led by Mayavati in UP for the first time in 
Indian history failed to have any perceptible impact on the literacy level in the state by 
the turn of the Millenium (see Table 1), despite bringing in formerly marginalized groups 
                                                 
10
 Note that this goes beyond the scope of our sample 1960-92. 
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in the government.11 Unfortunately, there is no denial of the fact that even a government 
led by Dalit people would want to maintain its dominance and thus continue to under-
invest in mass education to maintain its electoral base because educating them would 
dilute their long-term prospect of retaining power (through both economic and political 
participation of the poor). It is by now well-known that benefits from a large number of 
affirmative action policies and programmes targeted for the marginalised dalit in the 
Indian society have been monopolized by dalit men from a few sub-caste groups 
(Seenarine, 1997). The result would be persistence of disparity and under-development. 
This trend perhaps validates Acemoglu’s (2006) prediction that even with changes in 
political regime, broad form of elite dominance (subjugation of the marginalized people 
in somewhat different form) continues to persist.  
 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper attempts to explain the disparate nature of Indian social development, where 
female and low caste population are significantly worse off than the general population 
and more so when residing in one of the worse performing states in India. Persistence of 
low levels of education, especially among the marginalized groups (i.e., female and low-
caste people), is explained in terms of the hypothesis of elite dominance where the upper 
caste elite systematically adopts the policy of under-investment in mass education and the 
subjugation of the marginalized people persists in some form even with the change in 
political regime.  
                                                 
11
 This is in line with our regression results that higher proportion of female and low caste members of the 
assembly in the ruling government fails to boost education spending during 1960-92. 
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Results based on the Indian state-level data for the period 1960-92 suggest that 
higher share of land held by the top 5% of the population (a) lowers spending on 
education as well as total developmental spending and (b) increases total non-
developmental spending; greater proportion of minority representations (female and low 
caste members) in the ruling government however fails to have any perceptible impact on 
both development and non-development spending in our sample. Our analysis also 
identifies two policies, namely, land reform and poverty alleviation to erode the initial 
disadvantage of the marginalised people: in particular, greater initiatives of the state to 
enact land reform legislations enhance the spending on education. States with larger 
proportion of the poor (who often belong to the marginalised women and low-caste 
people) however tend to be associated with under-investment in education because of a 
lack of demand for education among the poor.  
Unfortunately, gender, caste and class based politics perpetuates inequality. 
Spread of human capital could help to overcome the traditional disparities of caste, class 
and gender, just as the removal of these inequalities helps the spread of human capital. 
Results of our analysis highlight the role of land reform and poverty alleviation to break 
the vicious circle of underdevelopment that offers endowment to improve the initial 
disadvantage of the marginalized people. This however is not an isolated process and 
needs to be implemented in conjunction with the education and financial sector reforms, 
enabling the marginalized people to take advantage of the on-going pro-market reforms 
as well as to consciously participate in the political process (and make an informed 
choice). Impartial judiciary has also a very important role to play to uphold this crucial 
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fundamental right, especially in its fight against criminalisation of the political process. 
We hope that future research will address some of these related issues. 
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Table 1. Characterisation of economic elite dominance, 1960-92 
 
  Period 1960-92 
 Literacy 
rates 
% of land held 
by 
  Gini index in 
consumption 
State 1991 2001 top 
5% 
bottom 
40% 
Gini 
index in 
land 
distribn 
Cumulative  
land 
reform 
legislation 
index 
Rural  Urban 
 
AP 44.10 61.1 41.4 0.79 0.74 1.58 29.6 32.4 
Assam 52.90 64.3 25.6 2.53 0.60 2.18 20.7 31.5 
Bihar 38.50 47.5 34.6 1.76 0.68 4.61 27.2 34.6 
Gujarat 61.30 70.0 31.7 0.73 0.69 3.33 27.6 30.2 
Haryana 55.80 68.6 - - - - 27.1 30.8 
J&K - 54.5 21.5 10.43 0.49 1.45 24.3 26.9 
Karnataka 56.00 67.0 32.8 1.29 0.67 2.55 29.3 34.5 
Kerala 89.80 90.9 42.3 7.95 0.69 5.64 32.6 40.6 
MP 44.20 64.1 29.7 2.61 0.63 3 31.0 35.6 
Maharastra 64.90 77.3 33.2 0.58 0.70 1.97 31.8 37.2 
Orissa 49.10 63.6 31.3 2.26 0.64 5.33 27.7 33.1 
Punjab 58.50 69.9 37.1 - 0.74 0.64 31.7 33.4 
Rajasthan 38.60 61.0 33.3 4.65 0.63 1 36.0 32.5 
Tamil  N 62.70 73.5 39.6 0.60 0.74 4.36 29.9 35.4 
UP 41.60 57.4 29.8 3.05 0.62 2.48 28.6 32.5 
West 
Bengal 
57.70 69.2 31.6 1.32 0.67 5.18 26.7 33.1 
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Table 2. Characterisation of political elite dominance, 1960-92 
 
 %  of women among 
all candidates in the 
assembly elections  
% of women among 
all mlas in the ruling 
party  
% of sc/st members 
among all mlas in the 
ruling party 
 All 
regimes 
INC 
regime 
All 
regimes 
INC 
regime 
All 
regimes 
INC 
regime 
AP 3.4 3.4 4.00 4.3 22.2 25.8 
Assam 2.0 1.6 3.1 4.4 24.6 25.4 
Bihar 2.4 2.5 4.7 5.8 22.7 23.8 
Gujarat 2.4 2.3 6.8 7.7 37.0 36.1 
Haryana 2.6 2.5 7.8 9.4 23.0 20.1 
J&K 1.3 1.0 1.7 3.5 3.9 6.93 
Karnataka 3.3 3.0 5.2 6.5 21.2 22.5 
Kerala 2.2 2.1 1.5 0 6.3 5.7 
MP 2.3 2.3 6.7 9.5 46.8 49.8 
Maharastra 3.2 3.3 5.8 6.2 18.0 20.3 
Orissa 2.5 2.3 4.4 4.7 47.1 54.6 
Punjab 2.8 2.7 5.0 8.2 23.6 24.8 
Rajasthan 2.0 1.7 6.5 7.1 35.6 34.6 
Tamil  N 2.1 1.2 4.6 3.4 21.2 22.8 
UP 2.3 2.4 6.0 8.1 24.4 24.4 
West 
Bengal 
2.1 1.7 4.0 3.5 28.0 24.0 
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Table 3. Presence of coalition government, degree of ethnic heterogeneity and  
voter turnout in the selected states, 1960-92 
 
   Voter turnout (%) 
State Coalition 
government 
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity  
SC/ST  Women  All  
AP 0.00 0.47 59.2 64.0 68.3 
Assam 0.00 0.64 57.5 56.0 61.3 
Bihar 0.25 0.70 41.7 42.5 53.5 
Gujarat 0.29 0.48 49.0 50.5 55.6 
Haryana 0.25 0.46 31.2 64.2 67.4 
J&K 0.00 0.26 31.7 51.2 69.0 
Karnataka 0.00 0.51 62.9 62.6 67.2 
Kerala 0.78 0.67 70.3 65.8 75.6 
MP 0.14 0.53 43.3 40.9 51.2 
Maharashtra 0.29 0.46 51.9 57.0 61.2 
Orissa 0.25 0.56 38.4 35.0 46.7 
Punjab 0.25 0.55 31.4 65.3 67.9 
Rajasthan 0.14 0.54 48.6 41.0 55.4 
Tamil  
Nadu 
0.25 0.44 63.3 66.1 69.7 
UP 0.11 0.63 35.9 43.6 50.5 
West 
Bengal 
0.88 0.66 64.2 57.8 67.3 
 
  
 38 
Table 4A. Effects of Elite Dominance: Fixed Effects Estimates of Changes in 
Education Spending, 1960-92  
 
 Change in Education spending (as a share of output) 
Variable  (1) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(2) Est. 
 (T-stat) 
(3) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(4) Est.  
(T-stat) 
Initial share of 
education spending 
0.09 (0.156) 0.05 (0.780) -0.02 (0.304) 0.03 (0.455) 
Land held by top 5% of 
the population 
-0.007 
(1.834)* 
- -  
Land reform legislation 
index 
- 0.008 
(2.468)** 
-  
Proportion of women 
MLA in ruling party 
- - 0.002 (1.217) - 
Proportion of SC/ST 
MLAs in ruling party 
- - 0.006 (0.784) - 
Proportion of women 
and SC/ST MLAs in 
ruling party 
- - - 0.002 (1.622) 
Social heterogeneity -0.02 
(4.577)** 
-0.02 (4.881)** -0.02 
(4.338)** 
-0.02 (4.314)** 
Coalition government -0.003 
(1.987)* 
-0.003 (1.984)* -0.002 
(1.648)* 
-0.003 (1.657)* 
R2 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 
F-Stat 5.67** 5.99** 5.31** 5.59** 
Nobs. 113 113 119 119 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or 
lower level. 
 39 
Table 4B. Effects of elite dominance with control for demand:  
Fixed Effects Estimates of Changes in Education Spending, 1960-92  
 
 Change in Education spending (as a share of output) 
Variable  (1) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(2) Est. 
 (T-stat) 
(3) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(4) Est.  
(T-stat) 
Initial share of 
education spending 
0.11 (1.846)* 0.13 (2.018)* 0.11 
(1.717)** 
0.10 (1.621) 
Land held by top 5% of 
the population 
-0.004 
(1.930)* 
 - - 
Land reform legislation 
index 
- 0.004 (1.632)* - - 
Proportion of women 
MLA in ruling party 
- - -0.0002 
(0.134) 
- 
Proportion of SC/ST 
MLAs in ruling party 
- - 0.005 (0.772) - 
Proportion of women 
and SC/ST MLAs in 
ruling party 
- -  0.0002 (1.143) 
Social heterogeneity -0.03 
(5.628)** 
-0.03 (5.687) -0.03 
(5.512)** 
-0.03 (5.494)** 
Coalition government -0.003 
(1.682)* 
-0.003 (1.689)* -0.002 (1.280) -0.003 (1.950)* 
Poverty head count 
ratio 
-0.0003 
(3.950)** 
-0.0003 
(3.635)** 
-0.0003 
(3.880)** 
-0.0003 
(3.898)** 
R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 
F-Stat 7.10** 7.17** 6.62** 6.92** 
Nobs. 113 113 119 119 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or 
lower level. 
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Table 4C. Effects of Elite Dominance: Fixed Effects Estimates of Changes in Non-
Developmental Spending, 1960-92  
 
 Change in non-developmental 
spending (as a share of output) 
Change in developmental 
spending (as a share of output) 
Variable  (1) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(2) Est. 
 (T-stat) 
(3) Est.  
(T-stat) 
(4) Est.  
(T-stat) 
Initial share of non-
development spending 
0.69 
(9.421)** 
0.69 (9.190)** 0.51 
(6.070)** 
0.58 (6.893)** 
Land held by top 5% of 
the population 
0.009 
(1.713)* 
- -0.004 
(1.721)* 
- 
Land reform legislation 
index 
- -0.005 (1.720)* - 0.006 (3.429)** 
Social heterogeneity -0.07 (1.418) -0.07 (1.202) -0.13 
(3.997)** 
-0.15 (4.691)** 
Coalition government -0.008 (1.417) -0.008 (1.379) -0.01 (1.718)* -0.01 (1.913)* 
R2 0.56 0.55 0.41 0.45 
F-Stat 5.71** 5.56** 4.32** 4.98** 
Nobs. 113 113 119 119 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or 
lower level. 
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Panel Probit Estimates of Congress Predominance 
 
Lagged variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Land held by top 
5% of the 
population 
0.24 (1.983)*  - - 
Land reform 
legislation index 
- -0.35 (2.367)* - - 
Proportion of 
women MLA in 
ruling party  
- - 0.57 (1.491) - 
Proportion of 
SC/ST MLAs in 
ruling party  
- - -0.74 (0.453) - 
Proportion of 
women and 
SC/ST MLAs in 
ruling party  
- - - 0.51 (1.417) 
Social 
heterogeneity  
0.4 (1.204) 0.21 (1.774) 0.81 (0.758) 0.78 (0.737) 
Coalition 
government 
-0.91 (2.036)* -0.94(2.111)* -0.78 (1.646)* -0.73 (1.679)* 
Log-L -54.00865      -51.086      -54.89061      -55.0620      
Log-L0 -68.68864 -68.68864 -68.68864 -68.68864 
LR (chi-square)     
Nobs. 121 121 121 121 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or 
lower level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. An explanation of the insignificance of the political dominance variables: 
Fixed effects estimates of proportion of elected women/SCST members in the ruling 
party 
 
Variables (1) Proportion 
of women MLA 
in the ruling 
party 
(2) Proportion 
of women MLA 
in the ruling 
party 
(3) Proportion 
of SC/ST MLA 
in the ruling 
party 
(4) Proportion of 
SC/ST MLA in 
the ruling party 
Women voters’ 
turnout 
-0.02 (0.589) 0.01 (0.236) - - 
SC/ST voters’ 
turnout 
- - -0.008 (0.719) -0.002 (1.337) 
Illiteracy rate - -0.13 (1.832)* - -0.52 (2.583)** 
Social 
heterogeneity  
- -0.27 (0.373) - -0.58 (0.369) 
Coalition 
government 
- -0.23 (1.758)* - -0.09 (3.656)** 
F 4.96** 4.83** 9.23** 8.61** 
R2 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.66 
Nobs. 121 121 121 121 
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or 
lower level. 
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